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When tax rates vary by asset, a "hidden" industrial policy may aid
industries that invest in a certain mix of assets.In this paper, we examine
whether differential use of depreciable assets gives rise to differential tax
treatment of high technology industries relative to other industries. First,
we calculate the total effective tax rate on a marginal investment in each of
34 assets. Next, using these asset—specific tax rates and weighting by the
use of these assets in each of 73 different industries, we calculate total
effective tax rates at the industry level. We find considerable variation
within the high—tech sector and within the more traditional sectpr, but for
the case of a taxable firm with a given debt/equity ratio, we do not find any
systematic differences between overall rates in the two sectors.
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(804) 924—7581The apparent decline of U.S. productivitygrowth, and its consequences
for the ability of the U.S. to maintain its international
competitiveness,
have stirred considerable debate on the need fora U.S. industrial policy.
Against this setting, observers of the U.S. tax system have notedthat the
widely varying tax treatments of capital investmentsmay already provide a de
facto industrial policy, one thatencourages investment in certain sectors of
the economy while discouraging investment elsewhere."High—technology" firms
claim that tax provisions discourage investment in their industriesrelative
to general manufacturing; at the same time, financially troubledusmoke_stacku
firms claim that they too are disadvantaged by the tax law.Understanding how
tax provisions apply to different industries is an importantobjective in
promoting international competitiveness, neutrality in the tax code, and
efficiency in the production of goods and services.
Major changes in the tax system occurred in 1981 with the Economic
Recovery Tax Act and in 1982 with the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act. These bills greatly accelerated depreciation deductionson many assets,
and they resulted in effective tax rates thatvary widely among assets. Since
firms in different industries use different mixes ofassets, they pay
different taxes and face different investment incentives. Thepurpose of this
paper is to compare the tax burden on a marginal investment in high—tech
industries with that of other industries, to see where differences arise and
which provisions of the tax code are responsible for these differences.
We first consider a profitable firm with the average sources offinance,
and we measure effective tax rates on marginal investments in each of 34
different depreciable assets. These rates account for personal andproperty
taxes as well as for differential investnent tax credits and depreciation
allowances under the corporate tax. We then employ Commerce Department data—2—
on the mix of investments made by each of 73 different industries (listed in
Table 3 below). We thus obtain effective tax rates with more disaggregation
by industry than is available in the literature, enough to isolate seven
individual industries that can be classified as "high—tech".
We find much variation in the tax rates facing the seven high—tech
industries, but as a group, they are taxed no differently than the other 66
industries. Moreover, recent changes in tax law made no impact on the
relative taxation of the two groups. Finally, we test the sensitivity of
these effective tax rates to changes in assumptions about the expected rate of
inflation, the expected rate of return, the firm's profitability for the use
of tax subsidies, the economic lifetimes for assets, and the debt/equity ratio
for financing. We find that changes in these parameters do not affect our
basic conclusion: to the extent that there are differences in the overall tax
burdens of high—technology and other industries, they are not attributable to
differences in the tax treatment of depreciable assets.
The next section defines the concept of effective tax rate that we
measure, while following sections describe results and make concluding
remarks.
Marginal Effective Total Tax Rates
The average effective tax rate includes the taxes actually paid as a
fraction of capital income. Such rates were used by Harberger (1966) in his
seminal study of the efficiency cost of differential effective tax rates.
They have been measured more recently by Felclstein and Summers (1979),
Feldstein, flicks—Mi reaux, and Poterba (1983), and Hulten and !obertson
(1984).Actual tax payments may include some lump—sun elements, however, and
may not reflect the expected future taxes on the expected income from a—3—
marginal dollar of investment.1 This study uses the concept of a marginal
effective tax rate, as defined and measured in such studies as Auerbach and
Jorgenson (1980), Hulten and Wykoff (1981a), Gravelle (1982), and Hulten and
Robertson (1982, 1984). Those studies look at corporate taxes only, whereas
Fullerton and Henderson (1984) and King and Fullerton (1984) look at the total
of corporate, personal and property tixes.
The tax rates on different assets are thoroughly exposited in those
sources, and a more complete description of the method we follow may be found
in Fullerton and Henderson (1984), hereafter FH. A profitable firm faces
statutory corporate tax rate u, deductible property tax per dollar of asset at
ratew, exponential depreciation rate 6, inflation rate it, nominal after-tax
discount rate r, investment tax credit rate k, and present value of
depreciationallowances per dollar of investment z. In competitive
equilibrium, the firm equates the net cost of the asset to the present value
of net returns. Following Hall and Jorgenson (1967), FH then show that the
social return p. gross of taxes but net of depreciation, can be written as:
p= (1—k—uz)(r—it + 6)/fl—ii) + w—6. (1)
Assuming arbitrage between bonds and real capital ,allassets must earn
the discount rate given by i(1—u) where i is the nominal interest rate. For
the fraction of the marginal investment that is financed by debt, the saver
with marginal rate rid earns i(l_md); for the fraction re financed by retained
earnings, the after—corporate—tax return 1(1—u) is subject to a low effective
capital gains tax and for ns financed by new share issues, the return is
eventually subject to dividend taxes at rate tins The weighted—average return
is:2—4—
= +fre1__flre
+fnsi(l_u)(lm)— it . (2)
The marginal effective total tax rate is the proportional difference
between the pretax return and the posttax return:
t(p-s)/p. (3)
In the actual calculations, we generally set s and then solve for the
implied interest rate from (2). With i, we get the social rate of return on
each asset from (1) and the tax rate from (3). For our standard case, we set
s =.05and it= .07,but we test the sensitivity of these and other
parameters. As in FH, u =.495to reflect both federal and state corporate
taxes. Property tax rates are .00768 for eqUipment, .01126 for structures,
and .01550 for public utilities. Personal tax rates are .238 for interest,
.356 for dividends, and .058 for capital gains. These reflect ownership
through tax—exempt vehicles and insurance companies, and the deferral of
capital gains. Weights f are given by .0490, .6143, and .3367 for new shares,
retained earnings, and debt finance, respectively. Depreciation rates for the
34 assets derive from Hulten and Wykoff (1981b), while credits and allowances
are set for each asset from the law.
The FH paper shows the value of k and the tax lifetime for each asset,
and it thoroughly describes our derivation procedures for z, the present value
of allowances for each asset.In brief, most equipment under the old tax law
(through 1980) was depreciated by double declining balance with lifetimes
based on the Asset Depreciation Range System. Seven—year assets received a 10
percent investment tax credit, reduced by one—third for five—year assets and—5—
by two—thirds for three—year assets. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
(ERTA), if it had been allowed to become fully effective as scheduled by 1986,
would have retained double declining balance for equipment while reducing
lifetimes to 3 years for autos, 5 years for other equipment, 10 years for some
public utility structures, and 15 years for other structures. The credit was
6 percent for autos and 10 percent for other equipment. Partly because
effective tax rates would have been reduced drastically, as shown below, the
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) cut off the
transition back to double declining balance and left equipment with 150
percent of declining balance. It also reduced the depreciation basis by half
the investment tax credit.
Results
The first column of Table 1 shows how the marginal effective tax rate
under the old law varied from a low of —4 percent for aircraft with credits
and relatively short lifetimes, to 51 percent for certain structures with no
credits and relatively long lifetimes. An effective subsidy means that the
value of the credits, depreciation allowances, and interest deductions at the
corporate level more than offset not only the corporate tax on the income from
this asset, but any property tax and personal tax as well. The subsidy to the
asset is received in the form of reductions in other corporate taxes. The
second column shows that ERTA, if fully phased in, would have made all
equipment tax rates negative while reducing structure tax rates somewhat.
Either because of the greater disparity of tax rates across assets, or because
of the greater pending revenue shortfall, Congress raised effective tax rates
on equipment by passing TEFRA. Column 3 shows that only some types of
equipment now face effective subsidies.—6—
In order to test the sensitivity of these results for current law
(TEFRA), we select two kinds of equipment in Table 2 The effective tax rates
on both assets rise somewhat with inflation because of historical cost
depreciation, despite the fact that higher nominal interest is deducted at a
.495 corporate rate and included at a .238 personal rate. Effective tax rates
rise slightly with the assumed net rate of return, but they fall dramatically
with higher investment tax credits. Both assets receive 10 percent credits
and the same depreciation schedules, even though actual depreciation rates
differ (.079 for engines and turbines and .273 for office and computing
machinery). As a consequence, any row of Table 2 shows the sensitivity of
results to this difference in economic depreciation.
From asset—specific effective tax rates similar to ours, Gravelle (1982)
obtains tax rates for 11 broad industries and 23 manufacturing sub—industries
by using data on the stock of each asset employed in each industry. While
capital stock weights might be preferred on conceptual grounds, available data
is insufficiently detailed to separate high—tech industries. Here, we use
weights given by gross investment in each of these 34 assets by each of the 73
industries listed in Table 3. The weights from the old law are used for all
three laws, even though tax changes might induce some substitution among
assets.3 Another potential problem is that these investments include only
equipment and structures, while we may wish to consider the taxation of
investment in land, inventories, and intangible assets.
Several definitions of 'high—tech" industry have been suggested.4 We use
a strict definition that classifies an industry as high—tech if its ratio of
R&D expenditures to net sales is twice the national average. Of the 73
industries, this standard is most closely met by seven, including the
production of 1) drugs, 2) office and computing equipment, 3) radio, T.V., and—7—
connunication equipment, 4) electronic components, 5) aircraft and parts, 6)
scientific instruments, and 7) optical equipment. The seven high—tech
industries are marked by double asterisks in Table 3.
Any such definition is beset by a number of problems. First, many firms
cannot be so easily allocated to a single industry. General Motors
manufactures its own microchips, even though it may be the quintessential
example of a smoke—stack firm. Second, while the seven high—tech industries
have the highest ratios of R&Dto net sales, they account for only a small
fraction of total R&D. Ford, GM. and Dupont together undertake more R&D than
the entire computer, software, and office equipment industries combined.5
Third, high—tech definitions may be based on processes rather than on
products. In fact, many traditional manufacturers have installed computerized
assembly lines using robots to help produce conventional goods, even though
they themselves may undertake little R&D. Nevertheless, our seven industries
embody many of the characteristics that one normally associates with high—
technology activities.
In the report underlying this research, Fullerton and Lyon (1983) provide
more detail on the composition of these industries and their investments.In
particular, equipment composes about 90 percent of depreciable investment in
construction but only 50 percent of the depreciable investment in petroleum
refining. High—tech industries are generally equipment—intensive, varying
between 87 percent for aircraft and 72 percent for drugs. These ratios are
reflected in Table 3, where for the 1980 law, effective tax rates range from
10 percent for construction to 34 percent for petroleum refining.6 Among
high—tech industries, the lowest rate is 17 percent for aircraft and the
highest is 24 percent for drugs and scientific instruments. The average rate-8-
for high—tech industries is 22 percent, only one point lower than the average
for all industries.
With the rapid depreciation allowances scheduled under ERTA to begin in
1986, investments would have faced net subsidies in most industries, including
all high—tech industries. The affective tax rate is —11 percent for high—tech
industries and —7 percent overall. The third column shows rates under TEFRA,
where allowances for equipment are scaled back, and all industries are left
with positive effective tax rates. High—tech and other industries still
differ only by one percentage point, at 13 and 14 percent respectively, as
shown at the bottom of the column. In fact, the 73 industries inlable 3 are
ordered according to their effective tax rates under TEFRA in the third
column. The general dispersion of double asterisks indicates that the
taxation of high—tech industries varies as much as the taxation of other
industries.7
Until now we have assumed that our typical firm has sufficient profits to
utilize all depreciation allowances and investment tax credits associated with
the marginal investment. This assumption is not valid-for many start—up firms
in high—tech industries or for ailing firms in smoke—stack industries. Many
authors, notably Auerbach (1983), have investigated the effect of tax law
asymmetries on the incentives to invest. However, it is difficult to make any
generalizations about how much investment takes place in start—up firms that
are still unprofitable, or in smoke—stack firms that have become-unprofitable,
and how long each type of firm expects to remain in that state.
-
Theeffective tax rate for a firm that does not expect to earn taxable
profits over the entire life of a new investment can be found by setting u and
k to zero.In this case, only property taxes differ by asset, resulting in
effective rates that lie between 34 and 38 percent for all industries. The—9-
overall average is 35 percent in both sectors. This calculation also
indicates that repeal of the corporate tax would raise effective tax rates:
credits, allowances and deductions more than offset corporate taxes under any
version of the law.8
High—tech firms also claim that their assets become obsolete faster than
those in other industries. To account for the possibility that the Hulten—
Wykoff depreciation rates do not adequately capture obsolescence of some high—
tech assets, we increase by twenty percent the economic depreciation rates on
ten selected assets (numbers 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 19, and 20 in Table
1). These assets are used to different degrees by different industries.
Effective tax rates increase by less than 2 percent for most of these assets,
by .8 percent for the economy, and by 1.1 percent for high—tech industries.
It is also suggested that start—up firms in high—tech industries, with
little tangible capital, nay rely primarily on equity finance. Interest
payments are deductible at the corporate level while the return to equity is
not, so the tax system may place a greater burden on firms with a high
proportion of equity. However, start—up firms are likely to retain a greater
proportion of earnings than mature firms, and they nay thus receive more
favorable capital gains treatment of earnings at the personal level. Note
also that if the valuable ideas of the start—up firm are windfall events not
affected by marginal incentives, then the extra tax on equity finance may be
more important for the issue of tax incidence than of allocational
efficiency.9
To account for the possibility that some firmsareconstrained by the
amount of debt they can issue, we cut by half the proportion for debt and
increase equity accordingly. Marginal effective tax rates are very sensitive
to this change. Under TEFRA, effective tax rates increase from13and 14— 10—
percentto 37 and 38 percent, for high—tech and other industries
respectively. There is little change, however, in the ranking of industries.
We are unable to determine the differential effect of including the tax
burden on investments in land, inventories, and intangible assets such as
R&D. Hulten and Robertson (1984) examine actual tax payments and compute
average effective tax rates for industries at the two—digit SIC level. They
find that average tax rates are higher for the high—tech sector than for the
smoke—stack sector. Given the many theoretical differences between average
and marginal effective tax rates, however, it is not clear whether the higher
average tax rate for high—tech industries results from greater investment in
non-depreciable assets omitted from our study, or whether it is caused by the
non—distortionary taxation of windfall gains and infraniarginal profit. The
latter do not affect marginal investment incentives. To the extent that any
tax differences may arise between high—tech and other industries, we may only
conclude that these differences are not caused by the tax treatment of
depreciable assets.
Conclusion
Differential effective tax rates can create significant economic costs by
distorting the choice of assets by firms within an industry, and by distorting
the allocation of capital among industries. For a profitable firm with a
given debt—equity ratio, our measure of a marginal effective total tax rate
exhibits substantial variation among assets and industries within either the
high—tech sector or the other more traditional smoke—stack sector. However,
the overall average of these rates does not differ between the two sectors.
This conclusion is robust to assumptions about the inflation rate, the net
rate of return, the economic depreciation rates, and the debt—equity ratio.— 11—
Inthese calculations, the mix of depreciable assets is theonly
difference between the two sectors. Also, the effective taxrates are
sensitive to assumptions about profitability and the source of financefor
marginal investments. As a consequence, our results indicate theimportance
of finding out whether the two sectors differ in either of theserespects.Table 1
MarginalEfftive Total. Tax Rates for Erh Asset
Asset 1. 2. 3.
1980 Law ERTA TEFRA
1Furniture and Fixtures 0.012 -0.306 0.006
2Fabricated Metal Products 0.101 —0.218 -0.007
3Engines and Turbines 0.169 -0.259 -0.017
4 Tractors 0.011 -0394 0.043
5Agricultural Machinery 0.002 -0.286 -0.003
6Construction Machinery 0.049 -0.410 0.048
7Mining and Oil Field Machinery0.023 -0.397 0.044
8Metalworking Machinery 0.148 -0.326 0.015
9Special Industry Machinery 0.123 -0.295 0.001
10 General Industrial Equipment 0.132 -0.326 0.015
11 Office and Computing Machinery -0,012 -0.618 0.110
12 Service Industry Machinery 0.071 -0.397 0.044
13 Electrical Machinery 0.130 -P.318 0.011
14 Trucks, Buses, and Trailers 0.058 -0.573 0.099
15 Autos 0.127 -0.388 0.051
16 Aircraft -0.039 -0.430 0.056
17 Ships and Boats 0.213 -0.254 0.020
18 Railroad Equipment 0.132 -0.241 -0.027
19 Instruments 0.077 -0.371 0.034
20 Other Equipment 0.053 -0.371 0.034
21 Industrial Buildings 0.475 0.376 0.376
22 Commercial Buildings 0.474 0.335 0.335
23 Religious Buildings 0.448 0.312 0.312
24 Educational Buildings 0.448 0.312 0.312
25 Hospital Buildings.
0.468 0.329 0.329
26 Other Nonfarm Buildings 0.512 0.405 0.4Ô5
2? Railroads -0.277 0.194 0.266
28 Telephone and Telegraph 0.304 0.228 0.310
29 Electric Light andPower 0.295 0.221 0.301
30 Gas Facilities 0.274 0.135 0.224
31 Other Public Utilities 0.291 0.152 0.255
32 Farm Structures 0.412 0.331 0.331
33 MIning, Shafts and Wells 0.311 0.237 0.237
34 Other Nonbuilding Facilities 0.446 0.351 0.351Table 2
The Sensitivity of Selected Effective Tax Rates under TEFRA
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MarginalEffafliveTotal Tc Rates for Eh xn&stry
RANK INDUSTRY 1980 LAW ERTA TEFRA
1 MOTOR VEHICLES 0.1873 -0.2002 0.0736
2 METAL CONTAINERS 0.1690 —0.2359 0.0751
3 CONSTRUCTION 0.1023 -0.3431 0.0809
4 PAPER 0.1911 —0.11150 0.0819
5 PLASTICS 0.1952 —0.1321 0.0081
6 RADIO AND TV BROADCASTING 0.1989 —0.1586 0.0893
7 AGRICULTURAL, EXCEPT LIVESTOCK 0.1119 —0.1567 0.0898
8 AGRICULTURAL, FORESTY & FISHERY SERVICES 0.1195 —0.2374 0.0905
9 TRANSPORTATION AND WAREHOUSING 0. 1q39 -0.2401 0.0925
10 SCREW MACHINE PRODUCTS 0.1940 -0.1761 0.0961
11 CHEMICALS 0.2022 -0.1167 0.1004
12 "AIRCRAFT AND PARTS 0.1653 -0.2097 0.1026
13 "ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS 0.2028 —0.1409 0.1033
14 PRIMARY IRON AND STEEL MANUFACTURING 0.2155 -0.1093 0.1113
15 FABRICS 0.2226 —0.0811 0.1119
16 APPAREL 0.2184 —0.09116 0.1149
17 CONSTRUCTION AND MINING MACHINERY 0.2082 —0.1331 0.1152
18 METALWORKING MACHINERY 0.2220 -0.1129 0.1153
19 STONE AND CLAY PRODUCTS 0.2013 -0.1218 0.1158
20 BUSINESS SERVICES 0.1536 -0.2416 0.1174
21 MISC. MACHINERY 0.2115 -0.1280 0.1183
22 GLASS 0.2090 -0.1112 0.1183
23 PAPERBOARD CONTAINERS 0.2080 -0.11811 0.1187
24 SERVICE INDUSTRY MACHINES 0.2141 —0.1183 0.1195
25 GENERAL INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY 0.2141 —0.1203 0.1202
26 MISC. ELECTRICAL MACHINERY 0.2194 —0. 1041 0.12011
21 PRIMARY NONFERROUS METALS MANUFACTURING 0.2282 -0.0647 0.1210
28 "RADIO• TV AND COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT 0.21116 —0.lllil 0.1218
29 "OPTICAL EQUIPMENT 0.2145 —0.12511 0.1231
30 LEATHER TANNING 0.2298 —0.0876 0.1238
31 PRINTING AND PUBLISHING 0.2198 -0.0938 0.12147
32 WOOD CONTAINERS 0.2272 -0.0888 0.1253
33 ELECTRICAL INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT 0.2265 —0.0939 0.1261
34 OTHER METAL PRODUCTS
-. 0.2219 —0.1091 0.1265
35 HOUSEHOLD APPLIANCES 0.2259 —0.0919 0. 1269
36 ELECTRIC LIGHTING 0.21403 —0.0725 0.1214
31 RUBBER 0.2336 —0.0674 0. 1215
38 FINANCE AND INSURANCE 0. 1689 —0.2051 0.1277
39 MISC. FABRICATED TEXTILE PRODUCTS 0.2190 —0.1004 0.1278
40 CHEMICAL MINERAL MINING 0.17914 —0.116k 0. 1294
111 FORESTRY AND FISHERY 0.2513 -0.0396 0.1299
42 LUMBER AND WOOD PRODUCTS 0.21614 -0.1102 0.13116
43 "OFFICE AND COMPUTING EQUIPMENT 0.2336 -0.0758 0.13117
114 MISC. TEXTILE GOODS AND FLOOR COVERINGS 0.21411 -0.0438 0.1385
uS COAL MINING 0.1891 —0.0816 0.1388
i6 STONE AND CLAY MINING 0.1880 -0.0952 0.1395
47 FARM MACHINERY 0.2363 -0.0118 0.1406
48 SPECIAL INDUSTRY MACHINERY 0.2407 —0.0653 0. 11406
49 FOOTWEAR 0.2223 -0.0968 0.1'116
50 COMMUNICATIONS 0.1967 —0.0593 0.11116
51 ENGINES AND TURBINES 0.2258 -0.0601 0.14514
52 FOOD PRODUCTS 0.2423 -0.0481 0.11462
53 MISC. MANUFACTURING 0.21166 -0.0513 0.1477
54 ORDNANCE 0.2562 —0.0247 0.1502
55 ••SCIENTIFIC INSTRUMENTS O.2'iSO -0.0534 0.1556 56 "DRUGS 0.21129 -0.0380 0.1589
51 HEATING,PIUM8ING,STRUCTURAL METAL PRODUCTS 0.2569 -0.0325 0.1607
56 MATERIALS HANDLING MACHINERY 0.2420 —0.0514 0. 1644 59 PAINT 0.2506 -0.0228 0.1656
60 AUTOMOBILE REPAIR 0.2690 -0.0334 0.1118
61 EATING AND DRINKING PLACES 0.2743 0.0239 0.17110 62 OTHER FURNITURE 0.2756 0.0139 0.1712
63 HOUSEHOLD FURNITURE 0.2186 0.0202 0. 1801
64 NONFERROUS MINING 0.2466 0.0682 0. 1831
65 WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE 0.2059 0.0102 0.1891 66 LIVESTOCK 0.2450 0.0251 0.1911 61 TOBACCO 0.28115 0.0475 0.1912
68 AMUSENENTS 0.2803 0.01126 0.1927
69 OTHER TRANSPORTATION EQUIP. 0.3029 0.011lt 0.1991
70 ELECTRIC, GAS AND WATER SERVICES 0.2396 0.0132 0.2118 71 CRUDE PETROLEUM AND GAS 0.2810 0. 1133 0.2152 72 IRON MINING 0.3214 0.1825 0.2365 13 PETROLEUM REFINING 0.3395 0.1461 0.2317
ECONOMY MARGINAL EFFECTIVE TOTAL TAX RATE 0.2260 -0.0715 0.1382
HIGH—TECH MARGINAL EFFECTIVE TOTAL TAX RATE0.2118 -0.1056 0. 1292Footnotes
1. See Fullerton (1984) for further discussion of the different measures of
effective tax rates.
2. With arbitrage between bonds and real capital at the firm level, the
individual earns different rates of return on debt and equity as shown in
equation (2). Fullerton and Henderson (1984) investigate the alternative
assumption of arbitrage at the individual level. In that case, the firm must
earn a higher return on equity financed investments than on debt financed
investments. Neither assumption can be consistent with full equilibrium in
this model with perfect certainty and one aggregate individual, but clientel
effects may explain the lack of individual arbitrage in a more complete model
with different individual groups.
3. The data is published in the July 1980 Survey of Current Business, and
further information is provided in the Department of Commerce, Bureau of
Economic Analysis, 1980, "New Structures and Equipment by Using Industries,
1972: Detailed Estimates and Methodology," Staff Paper 35 (September)
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
4. See Riche et al (1983).
5."R&D Scoreboard 1982," Business Week, June 20, 1983.
6. Our relatively high rates of tax for crude petroleum and petroleum
refining may not reflect the ability of fins to expense many structural
investments in oil and gas production.
7. The Tax Reform Act of 1984 raises the lifetime for structures from 15 to
18 years. Our estimates indicate that this change also makes little
difference to results.
8. Weighting by gross investment increases the importance of equipment,
however.
9. See Stiglitz (1973) for a view of the corporate tax as a tax on
entrepreneurship.References
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